AbstrAct
INtrODUctION
In the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey (Ambrose, 2001) , a savannah-dwelling ape has a eurekalike flash of inspiration in realizing the awesome power of the bone tool in his hands. He tosses it skyward, where it morphs into a space station at the dawn of this millennium.
Since the first production of tools at the beginning of human presence on Earth, evolutionary jumps mark human development. Sometimes these punctuations were triggered by inventions of new tools, combined with new environmental adaptations.
Affordances, as specialized forms of symbiotic embodiment with tools and environments, represent one of the main factors for human evolutionary processes.
The cognitive neuroscience of the reflexive function can be one of the main keys to understand how the emergence of new interfaces yields new ways of projecting the human presence and consciousness in the world. In recent times, information science and technology are accumulating ground for new possible evolutionary jumps. Computing devices, molecular biology, and new media (all members in different ways of the ICT set) are redesigning the human embodiment and its environment. An integrated approach of ICT and neuroscience can design a map for new possible human evolutions.
sEttING
Stone-tool technology, robust australopithecines, and the genus Homo appeared almost simultaneously 2.5 million years ago. Once this adaptive threshold was crossed, technological evolution continued to be associated with increased brain size, population size, and geographical range. Traits of behavior, economy, mental capacities, neurological functions, the origin of grammatical language, and sociosymbolic systems have been inferred from the archaeological record of Paleolithic technology (Ambrose, 2001) .
Homo habilis is, obviously, considered the first toolmaker. The contiguity in the brain of Broca's area, involved in oro-facial fine motor control and language, to the area for precise hand motor control might be more than casual. The hand of Homo habilis resembles that of modern humans. Its brain was significantly larger (600 to 800 cm 3 ) than that of earlier and contemporary australopithecines and extant African apes (450 to 500 cm 3 ), and its teeth were relatively small for its body size, suggesting a relation between tool use, quality of diet, and intelligence.
The production of tools and artifacts is linked to the development of language, culture, and cognitive functions. This happened as tools and artifacts were, just as other sociolinguistic processes, mediating and reflexing interfaces in environmental and social interactions.
We need to know more about the ways in which speaking, tool using, and sociality are interwoven into the texture of everyday life in contemporary human groups. The birth of technique was incubated in the complex system of material resources, tools, operational sequences and skills, verbal and nonverbal knowledge, and specific modes of work coordination that come into play in the fabrication of material artifacts. It is a process-a complex interplay of reflexivity between sensory-motor skills, symbolic cognition, tools, artifacts, and environment.
James J. Gibson (1979) , in this context, originally proposed the concept of affordance to refer to "all action possibilities" latent in a specific environment, objectively measurable, Figure 1 . Neurocognitive dynamics in affordance, for example, grasping a mug (Arbib, 2002) and independent of the individual's ability to recognize those possibilities. Furthermore, these action possibilities are dependent on the physical capabilities of the agent. For instance, a set of steps with risers 4 feet high does not afford the act of climbing if the actor is a crawling infant. Therefore, we should measure affordances along with the relevant actors. Donald Norman (1988) introduced the term affordance in human-machine interaction, which made it a very popular term in the interaction design field. Later, he clarified he was actually referring to a perceived affordance as opposed to an objective affordance (Norman, 1999) . This new definition clarified that affordances are determined not only by the physical capabilities of the agent, but also by the individual and social knowledge embedded in objects and interactions of everyday life.
For example, if an agent steps into a room with a chair and a book, Gibson's definition of affordance allows a possibility that the agent may look at the chair and sit on the book as this is objectively possible. Norman's definition of perceived affordance captures the likelihood that the actor will sit on the chair and look at the book because of the embodiment and social knowledge embedded as affordance in these objects.
As Figure 1 clearly presents, affordances are rooted in motor schemes and neurocognitive dynamics.
FOcUs
The significance of evolutionary theory to the human sciences cannot be fully appreciated without a better understanding of how phenotypes in general, and human beings in particular, modify significant sources of selection in their environments, thereby codirecting subsequent biological evolution. Empirical data and theoretical arguments suggest that human technocultural activities have influenced human genetic evolution by modifying sources of natural selection and altering genotype frequencies in some human populations (Bodmer & Cavalli-Sforza, 1976) . Technocultural traits, such as the use of tools, weapons, fire, cooking, symbols, language, and trade, may have also played important roles in driving hominid evolution in general and the evolution of the human brain in particular (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995) . It is more than likely that some cultural and scientific practices in contemporary human societies are still affecting human genetic evolution. Modern molecular biologists do interfere with genes directly on the basis of their acquired scientific experiences, though this practice might be too recent to have already had an enduring impact on human genetic evolution. In any case, it already brings a new reflexive loop in our development.
Other evolutionary biologists maintain that culture frequently does affect the evolutionary process, and some have begun to develop mathematical and conceptual models of gene-culture coevolution that involve descriptions not only of how human genetic evolution influences culture, but also of how human culture can drive, or codirect, some genetic changes in human populations (Feldman & Laland, 1996) . These models include culturally biased, nonrandom mating systems; the treatment of human sociocultural or linguistic environments as sources of natural selection (Aoki & Feldman, 1987) ; and the impact of different cultural activities on the transmission of certain diseases (Durham, 1991) . The common element among these cases is that cultural processes change the human selective environment and thereby affect which genotypes survive and reproduce.
Culture works on the basis of various kinds of transmission systems (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) , which collectively provide humans with a second, nongenetic knowledge-carrying inheritance system.
Niche construction from all ontogenetic processes modifies human selective environments, generating a legacy of modified natural selection pressures that are bequeathed by human ancestors to their descendants. Figure 2 best captures the causal logic underlying the relationship between biological evolution and cultural change (Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000) .
If the technocultural inheritance of an environment-modifying human activity persists for enough generations to produce a stable selective pressure, it will be able to codirect human genetic evolution. For example, the culturally inherited traditions of pastoralism provide a case in point. Apparently, the persistent domestication of cattle, sheep, and so forth and the associated dairying activities did alter the selective environments of some human populations for sufficient generations to select for genes that today confer greater adult lactose tolerance (Durham, 1991) . Although other species of animals have their "proto-cultures" (Galef, 1988) , it has generally been assumed that Homo sapiens is the only extant species with a technocultural transmission stable enough to codirect genetic evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) . We may conclude that our technoculture is part of our ecological niche.
Building on ideas initially developed by Lewontin (1983) , Laland previously proposed that biological evolution depends not only on natural selection and genetic inheritance, but also on niche construction (Laland et al., 1996a) . Niche construction refers to the activities, choices, and metabolic processes of organisms through which they define, choose, modify, and partly create their own niches. It consists of the same processes that Jones et al. (1997) call "ecosystem engineering."
For example, to varying degrees, organisms choose their own habitats, mates, and resources, and construct important components of their local environments such as nests, holes, burrows, paths, webs, dams, and chemical environments. Many organisms also partly destroy their habitats Figure 2 . Evolutionary dynamics involving genes and technoculture (Laland et al., 2000) through stripping them of valuable resources or building up detritus, processes we refer to as negative niche construction.
Organisms may niche construct in ways that counteract natural selection, for example, by digging a burrow or migrating to avoid the cold, or they may niche construct in ways that introduce novel selection pressures, for example, by exploiting a new food resource, which might subsequently select for a new digestive enzyme. In every case, however, niche construction modifies one or more sources of natural selection in a population's environment.
One theoretical construct that captures some, but not all, of the consequences of niche construction is Dawkins' (1982) "extended phenotype." Dawkins argues that genes can express themselves outside the bodies of the organisms that carry them. For example, the beaver's dam is an extended phenotypic effect of beaver genes. Like any other aspect of the phenotype, extended phenotypes play an evolutionary role by influencing the chances that the genes responsible for the extended phenotypic trait will be passed on to the next generation. Dawkins emphasizes this single aspect of the evolutionary feedback from niche construction.
However, the beaver's dam sets up a host of selection pressures, which feed back to act not only on the genes responsible for the extended phenotype, but also on other genes that may influence the expression of other traits in beavers, such as the teeth, tail, feeding behavior, susceptibility to predation or disease, social system, and many other aspects of their phenotypes. It may also affect many future generations of beavers that may inherit the dam, its lodge, and the altered river or stream, as well as many other species of organisms that now have to live in a world with a lake in it.
An example of contemporary environmental niches in information technology can be obviously found in the computer mouse and its related iconic desktop-like interface. An evolution of the creation of virtual spaces that can change the way we perceive and interact with other dimensions of our realities is presented in new commercial and experimental interfaces. It is clear that every human interface tends to use biomechanical and physiological properties of the human body in order to reach a possible perfect symbiosis between man and machine.
The result is the possibility of a real-time interaction with a real or a conceptual object within a learning environment based on augmented reality, adding new dimensions to our usual everyday reality and, at the same time, giving a new reality to scientific "mind objects." For instance, the Wii Remote for Nintendo video games is a sophisticated controller, fusing the familiarity of a remote control with motion or neurophysiologic sensing technology. (Laland et al. 2000) Other experimental devices or prototypes might be interesting examples: Eye movements, brain waves, and other biosignals are captured and amplified to translate them into useful logic commands and neural-signal interpretation (such as emotions).
MIrrOrs
In "Language within our Grasp," Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) showed that the mirror system in monkeys is the homologue of Broca's area, a crucial speech area in humans, and they argued that this observation provides a neurobiological missing link for the long-argued hypothesis that primitive forms of communication based on manual gesture preceded speech in the evolution of language. "Language readiness evolved as a multimodal manual/facial/vocal system with proto-sign (manual-based protolanguage) providing the scaffolding for proto-speech (vocal-based protolanguage). There was the "neural critical mass" to trigger the emergence of language (Arbib, 2002 (Arbib, , 2005 via the mirroring between neurons at the dendrite and axon level. The neurodynamic result of this critical mass was the possibility to reach the threshold, which in terms of dynamical systems is the number of degrees of freedom necessary for effective psychodynamics (Freeman, 1975; Orsucci, 1998) .
The mirror-system hypothesis states that the matching of neural code for execution and observation of hand movements in the monkey is present in the common ancestor of monkey and human. It is the precursor of the crucial language property of parity, namely that an utterance usually carries similar meaning for speaker and hearer. Imitation plays a crucial role in human language acquisition and performance: Brain mechanisms supporting imitation were crucial to the emergence of Homo sapiens. Rizzolatti & Arbib (1998) hypothesize several stages of this evolution. a. Grasping b. A mirror system for grasping (i.e., a system that matches observation and execution) c. A simple imitation system for grasping d. A complex imitation system for grasping Speech, characterized as being the openended production and perception of sequences of vocal gestures, without implying that these sequences constitute a language g. Verbal language A mirror system for grasping in the monkey has been found in area F5 of the premotor cortex, while data have been found consistent with the notion of a mirror system for grasping in humans in Broca's area, which is homologous to monkeys' F5 but in humans is most often thought of as a speech area. Following their findings and hypothesis, language evolved from a basic mechanism not originally related to communication: the mirror system with its capacity to generate and recognize a set of actions.
There are some difficult questions posed by the interaction between new media and the mirror system. The different kinds of reality experience produced by new media might activate, via direct perception, presentations or action-like brain effects, or enduring plasticity effects. We are not referring just to the banal imitation induction we might experience after an immersive movie, but also to the longer lasting molding of the brain by the mirroring induced by all the most various contents provided by new media. It is a problem older generations never encountered, and the spreading of diagnoses such as attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder can be related to this (as we will see later on).
The linguist Noam Chomsky (e.g., 1975 ) has argued that since children acquire language rapidly despite the "poverty of the stimulus," the (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) basic structures of language are encoded in the brain, forming a universal grammar encoded in the human genome. For example, it is claimed that the universal grammar encodes the knowledge that a sentence in a human language could be ordered as subject-verb-object, subject-object-verb, and so forth, so that the child simply needs to hear a few sentences of his first language to "set the parameter" for the preferred order of that language. Against this, others have argued that in fact the child does have a rich set of language stimuli, and that there are now far more powerful models of learning than those that Chomsky took into account, allowing us to explain how a child might learn from its social interactions aspects of syntax that Chomsky would see as genetically prespecified. The reader may consult Lieberman (1991) for a number of arguments that counter Chomsky's view. Here we simply observe, for example, that many youngsters today easily acquire the skills of Web surfing and video-game playing despite a complete poverty of the stimulus, namely the inability of their parents to master these skills. We trust that no one would claim that the human genome contains a Web-surfing gene. Instead, we know the history of computers, and know that technology has advanced over the last 55 years to take us from an interface based on binary coding to a mouse-and-graphics interface so well adapted to human sensory motor capabilities that a child can master it.
We reject Chomsky's view that many of the basic alternatives of grammatical structure of the world's current languages are already encoded in the human genome so that the child's experience merely sets parameters to choose among prepackaged alternative grammatical structures. The experimental evidence of this hypothesis, years after it was proposed, is still weak. The different view, which I support, holds that the brain of the first Homo sapiens was language-ready, but it required many millennia of invention and technocultural evolution for human societies to form human languages in the modern sense.
The structure of a language-ready brain had reached a critical neural mass action (Freeman, 1975) of connections and feedback redundancies capable to provide reflexivity and the emergence of consciousness. The mirror neurons finding is based on the massive increment of feedback and regulations embedded in the human brain architecture. In this sense, mirroring and reflexivity are embedded in the usual functioning of all neurons and structured in some more specialized ones. Chomsky and his followers instead, in some way, present a Platonist approach claiming that the socalled deep structures-symbols and genes-are primary and antecedent to bio-psycho-physical experiences. We prefer a more realistic complexity approach that recognizes different biological and nonbiological factors in language development (Orsucci, 2002; Tomasello, 2003) .
In this framework, it is quite interesting to consider how Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) propose that at Stage 5, the manual-based communication system broke through the fixed repertoire of primate vocalizations to yield a combinatorial open repertoire, so that Stage 6, speech, did not build upon the ancient primate vocalization system, but rather rested on the invasion of the vocal apparatus by collaterals from the communication system based on F5 or Broca's area. In discussing the transition to Homo sapiens, they stress that our predecessors must have had a relatively flexible, open repertoire of vocalizations, but this does not mean that they, or the first humans, had language. They hold that human language (as well as some dyadic forms of primate communication) evolved from a basic mechanism that was not originally related to communication: the capacity to recognize actions.
Psychoanalytical studies highlight the important perspective of mirroring in emotional development. The reflexive function is central also in the definition of identity and relations. Freud (1920/n.d.) had focused on a child's game, becoming famous as Fort/Da, in which a mirror can be used by the child to represent the disap-pearance of the caregiver. Lacan (1937 Lacan ( /2005 proposed a specific stage in child development, called le stade du miroir, in which the child reaches recognition of his or her image in a mirror. This stage, linked to a crucial step in the integration of the central nervous system, is evident also in some primates and was considered crucial in the establishment of a self-conscious identity. Gaddini (1969) explored imitation as a primary form of identification. Winnicott (1987) extended this notion to reflexive responsiveness a child can receive from the caregiver, the family, and the extended social environment. Fonagy and Target (1997) state that reflective function is the developmental acquisition that permits the child to respond not only to other people's behavior, but to his or her conception of their beliefs, feelings, hopes, pretense, plans, and so on: "Reflective function or mentalization enables children to 'read' people's minds." Paulina Kernberg (2006) recalls how the mirror function of the mother is expanded to the idea of attunement between mother and child (Stern, 1983) , resonating affectively, visually, vocally, and by movement and touch.
EVOLUtION
Judging from the anatomical and cultural remains left by hominids and early humans, the most important evolutionary steps were concentrated into a few transition periods when the process of change was greatly accelerated, and these major transitions introduced fundamentally new capacities. Merlin Donald (1997) , within the same research line, proposes some evolutionary punctuation in the development of the human embodied mind.
The first transition is mimetic skill and autocueing. The rationale for the first transition is based on several premises: (a) The first truly human cognitive breakthrough was a revolution in motor skill-mimetic skill-which enabled hominids to use the whole body as a representational device, (b) this mimetic adaptation had two critical features-it was a multimodal modeling system, and it had a self-triggered rehearsal loop (that is, it could voluntarily access and retrieve its own outputs), (c) the sociocultural implications of mimetic skill are considerable and could explain the documented achievements of Homo erectus, (d) in modern humans, mimetic skill in its broadest definition is dissociable from language-based skills, and retains its own realm of cultural usefulness, and (e) the mimetic motor adaptation set the stage for the later evolution of language.
Mimesis can be just an emergent property of the mass action in the nervous system as the mirror function is a specialization of the arousal and feedback neural processes. The embodiment of mind processes becomes, in this way, a neurobiological necessity. As the whole body becomes a potential tool for expression, a variety of new possibilities enter the social arena: complex games, extended competition, pedagogy through directed imitation (with a concomitant differentiation of social roles), a subtler and more complex array of facial and vocal expressions, and public action-metaphor, such as intentional group displays of aggression, solidarity, joy, fear, and sorrow. The emergence of religious practice could also be considered, in its animistic beginnings, as an inclusive extension of mimetic functions to the living and nonliving environment.
The second transition is the lexical invention. The rationale for the second transition is briefly as follows: (a) Since no linguistic environment yet existed, a move toward language would have depended primarily on developing a capacity for lexical invention, (b) phonological evolution was accelerated by the emergence of this general capacity for lexical invention, and included a whole complex of special neuronal and anatomical modifications for speech, (c) the language system evolved as an extension of lexical skill, and gradually extended to the labeling of relationships between words, and also to the imposition of more and more complex metalinguistic skills that govern the uses of words, (d) the natural collective product of language was narrative thought (essentially, storytelling), which evolved for specific social purposes and serves essentially similar purposes in modern society, and (e) further advanced products are technical jargons and mathematical notations. These new representational acts-speech and mimesis-both are performed covertly as well as overtly.
Covert speech has been called inner speech or inner dialogue to stress how it is equivalent to the activation of the central aspects of articulation, without actual motor execution. The mental operation we call imagination can similarly be seen as mimesis without motor execution of imagined acts and situations. The control of mimetic imagination (probably even of visual generative imagery, which is facilitated by imagined self-movement) presumably lies in a special form of kinematical imagery. Autoretrievability is just as crucial for covert imaginative or linguistic thought as it is for the overt or acted-out equivalent. Thus, given a lexicon, the human mind became able to self-trigger recall from memory in two ways: by means of mimetic imagination, and by the use of word-symbols, either of which could be overt or covert.
The third transition is grammar and other metalinguistic skills. According to the competition model proposed by Bates and MacWhinney (1987) , the whole perisylvian region of the left hemisphere of the brain is diffusely dedicated to language, with function words and grammatical rules being stored in the same tissue as other kinds and aspects of lexical entries. However, we readily admit that this issue, like many others in this field, is still not conclusively resolved; there is electrophysiological evidence that function words-those most relevant to grammar-might have a different cerebral representation from open-class words (Neville, 1992) .
sYNcHrONIZAtIONs
In the classical sense, the word synchronization (literally, from ancient Greek, sharing time) means: "adjustment or entrainment of frequencies of periodic oscillators due to a weak interaction." Synchronization is a basic nonlinear phenomenon in physics, discovered in interactions between pendulums at the beginning of the modern age of science. More recently, Maturana and Varela (1980) had suggested that sync is a form of structural coupling, a process that occurs when two structurally plastic systems repeatedly perturb one another's structure in a nondestructive way over a period of time. This leads to the development of structural fit between systems. There is an intimate relationship between this process and the emergence of appropriate behavior from the interplay between interacting systems because the structure of a system determines its responses to perturbing environmental events. Maturana (2002) stressed this dynamical approach in semiotic terms within a coevolutionary perspective: "Language is a manner of living together in a flow of coordination of coordinations of consensual behaviours or doings that arises in a history of living in the collaboration of doing things together." This dynamical systems' approach leads to control and synchronization in chaotic or complex systems. Pecora and Carroll (1990) and Ott, Grebogi, and Yorke (1990) opened a new and reliable way to contemporary research on control and synchronization of complex systems.
We have been investigating sync during natural conversations, finding that it is a quite complex phenomenon happening at the same time as the nonverbal, phonetic, syntactic, and semantic levels (Orsucci, 2006; Orsucci, Giuliani, & Zbilut, 2004; Orsucci, Walters, Giuliani, Webber, & Zbilut, 1999) . The statistical tool we consider most suitable for this kind of study is recurrence quantification analysis (Eckmann, Kamphorst, & Ruelle, 1987; Marwan, 2003; Webber & Zbi-lut, 1994) . Coordination between conversation partners occurs at multiple levels, including the choice of syntactic structure (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000) . A number of outstanding questions concerning the origin of this coordination require novel analytic techniques. Our research can be considered complementary to a study by Shockley, Santana, and Fowler (2003) , in which interpersonal coordination during conversation was based on recurrence strategies to evaluate the shared activity between two postural time series in a reconstructed phase space.
In a study on speech and rhythmic behavior, Port et al. (1999) found that animals and humans exhibit many kinds of behavior where frequencies of gestures are related by small integer ratios (like 1:1, 2:1, or 3:1). Many properties like these are found in speech as an embodied activity considered as an oscillator prone to possible synchronizations. Our findings in the synchronization of conversation dynamics can be relevant for the general issue of the structural coupling of psychobiological organizations. Implications are related with psycho-chrono-biology research and the clinical field. Data on synchronization suggest that this dynamic behavior can be evident also in semiotic and cognitive dynamics, besides the well-established research on biological oscillators. For example, Dale and Spivey (2006) used this method to explore lexical and syntactic coordination between children and caregivers in conversation. Results indicate that children and caregivers coordinate sequences of syntactic classes, and that this coordination diminishes over development. Similar studies highlight synchronization of eye movements in conversations (Richardson & Dale, 2005) .
Synchronization is a crucial area to study in order to bridge biophysics, neuroscience, and information technologies. Sharing time, in different time frames, is critical for neurodynamics, consciousness, and cooperation with humans and nonhumans (machines included). We might cite, for example, applications from several research groups as some key areas of the current research in information science and technology in which synchronization is so important, though it might not be fully recognized. (Orsucci et al., 2004) Petitot, 1999) . This overall approach to cognition is based on situated embodied agents. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) and Thompson (2001) have proposed the adjective enactive to designate this approach more precisely. It comprises two complementary aspects.
Figure 5. Synchronization during a natural conversation
1. Ongoing coupling of the cognitive agent, a permanent coping that is fundamentally mediated by sensory-motor activities 2. Autonomous activities of the agent whose identity is based on emerging, endogenous configurations (or self-organizing patterns) of neuronal activity Enaction implies that sensory-motor coupling modulates, but does not determine, an ongoing endogenous activity that it configures into meaningful world items in an unceasing flow. From an enactive viewpoint, any mental act is characterized by the concurrent participation of several functionally distinct and topographically distributed regions of the brain and their sensory-motor embodiment. From the point of view of the neuroscientist, it is the complex task of relating and integrating these different com-ponents that is at the root of temporality. These various components require a frame or window of simultaneity that corresponds to the duration of lived subjective present. These kinds of present are not necessarily conscious; often they are not, though they might not be unconscious in the folk Freudian way (Orsucci, Giuliani, Webber, Zbilut, Fonagy, & Mazza, 2006) . There are three possible scales of duration to understand the temporal horizon just introduced (though other scales of extended present, considered in chronobiology, might considered).
• basic or elementary events (the 1/10 scale) • relaxation time for large-scale integration (the 1 scale) • descriptive-narrative assessments (the 10 scale)
The first level is already evident in the socalled fusion interval of various sensory systems: the minimum distance needed for two stimuli to be perceived as nonsimultaneous, a threshold that varies with each sensory modality. These thresholds can be grounded in the intrinsic cellular rhythms of neuronal discharges, and in the temporal summation capacities of synaptic integration. These events fall within a range of 10 ms (e.g., the rhythms of bursting interneurons) to 100 ms (e.g., the duration of an EPSP/IPSP sequence in a cortical pyramidal neuron). These values are the basis for the 1/10 scale. Behaviorally, these elementary events give rise to microcognitive phenomena variously studied as perceptual moments, central oscillations, iconic memory, excitability cycles, and subjective time quanta. For instance, under minimum stationary conditions, reaction time Figure 6 . Windows of time (Varela et al., 1991) or oculomotor behavior displays a multimodal distribution with a 30-to 40-millisecond distance between peaks; in average daylight, apparent motion (or "psi-phenomenon") requires 100 ms.
This leads naturally to the second scale, that of long-range integration. Component processes already have a short duration, about 30 to 100 ms; how can we understand such experimental psychological and neurobiological results at the level of a fully constituted, normal cognitive operation? A long-standing tradition in neuroscience looks at the neuronal bases of cognitive acts (perception-action, memory, motivation, and the like) in terms of cell assemblies (CAs) or, synonymously, neuronal ensembles. A CA is a distributed subset of neurons with strong reciprocal connections.
The diagram depicts the three main time frames considered here. A cognitive activity (such as head turning) takes place within a relatively incompressible duration: a cognitive present. The basis for this emergent behavior is the recruitment of widely distributed neuronal ensembles through increasingly frequent coherence in the gamma (30-80 Hz) band. Thus, we might depict the corresponding neural correlates of a cognitive act as a synchronous neural hypergraph of brain regions undergoing bifurcations of phase transitions from a cognitive present content to another.
Recently, this view has been supported by widespread findings of oscillations and synchronies in the gamma range (30-80 Hz) in neuronal groups during perceptual tasks. Thus, we have neuronal-level constitutive events that have a duration on the 1/10 scale, forming aggregates that manifest as incompressible but complete cognitive acts on the 1 scale. This completion time is dynamically dependent on a number of dispersed assemblies and not on a fixed integration period; in other words, it is the basis of the origin of duration without an external or internally ticking clock.
"Nowness," in this perspective, is therefore presemantic in that it does not require a remembering in order to emerge. The evidence for this important conclusion comes, again, from many sources. For instance, participants can estimate durations of up to 2 to 3 seconds quite precisely, but their performance decreases considerably for longer times. Spontaneous speech in many languages is organized such that utterances last 2 to 3 seconds and short, intentional movements (such as self-initiated arm motions) are embedded within windows of this same duration.
This brings to the fore the third duration, the 10 scale, proper to descriptive-narrative assessments. In fact, it is quite evident that these endogenous, dynamic horizons can be, in turn, linked together to form a broader temporal horizon. This temporal scale is inseparable from our descriptive-narrative assessments and linked to our linguistic capacities. It constitutes the "narrative centre of gravity" in Dennett's (1991) metaphor: the flow of time related to personal identity. It is the continuity of the self that breaks down under intoxication or in pathologies such as schizophrenia or Korsakoff's syndrome. As Husserl (1980) points out, commenting on similar reasoning in Brentano, "We could not speak of a temporal succession of tones if…what is earlier would have vanished without a trace and only what is momentarily sensed would be given to our apprehension." To the appearance of the just-now, one correlates two modes of understanding and examination (in other words, valid forms of donation in the phenomenological sense): (a) remembrance or evocative memory, and (b) mental imagery and fantasy.
The "Urimpression" is the proper mode of nowness, or in other words, it is where the new appears; impression intends the new. Briefly, impression is always presentational, while memory or evocation is representational.
These neurophysiologic events are correlated to microcognitive phenomena and behavioral elements variously studied as perceptual moments, central oscillations, iconic memory, excitability cycles, and subjective time quanta: the elementary particles of reflexions we can share with humans and media. Coupling and sharing between humans and machines are happening at this level, when metacognitive and mental skills are certainly unusual. It is the "a-conscious" level and modality, preliminary to any unconscious or preconscious modes. The kind of reflexivity implied in these processes concerns the embodied mind. It is a kind of cognitive capacity fully incorporated in bodily actions and reactions. These kinds of processes involve a presentational intentionality, not a representational intellect. It is a form of direct cognition, not a self-conscious metacognition.
The embodied mind emerges and grows (bottom-up) on the basic reflexive function as a direct parameter in biological processes. Reflection is a metacognitive function (top-down): "the overall reflective process can embed more conceptual and linguistic functions in the brain than the reflexive component alone" (Siegel, 2007) . Some authors use the terms synonymously, but we prefer to use a different terminology to stress a conceptual and factual difference. Reflexivity will be direct and nonconceptual: It implies an immediate capacity of awareness without effort or intellectualization. In reflexivity, the interface is just like your own skin, and it is useful remember that the embryological origin of skin, brain, and mind is the same. The ectoderm, our primary interface, is the outermost of the three primary germ layers of an embryo and the source of the epidermis, the nervous system, the eyes, and the ears, that is, the interfaces.
Reflexions happen at a very precognitive stage, before any higher order metacognition might be established. We have been exploring some important implications of mirror neuron research. New findings by Libet (1993) and Libet, Freeman, and Sutherland (1999) on the so-called readiness potential extend our perspectives on this matter. Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) had found that all actions are preceded by a slow potential easily detected in an EEG. They gave this potential a German name, bereitschaft-potential, but nowadays it is more frequently called in English readiness potential (RP). A question was quite immediate: As the RP was happening at about 550 ms before action, in which timing (and maybe causal) sequence was it placed with representations and decisions concerning that same action? It was found that every conscious representation and Figure 7 . Libet et al. (1999) decision of acting (or not) were placed at just 200 ms before action, so they were following the RP at about 300 ms. Benjamin Libet, an American neurophysiologist, has been expanding research in this area both in the sensory and the motor fields, including some possible psychological and philosophical implications (Libet, 1993; Libet et al., 1999) . His vantage point might be summarized in this way: We do not have free will, but we do have free denial. We have the possibility to facilitate or stop an action after it has been started in an a-conscious way. Recent advancements in the complex neurodynamics of time could provide seminal contributions in advancing our understanding of ethical issues on the personal responsibility of actions (Gazzaniga, 2005 ).
It is not surprising then that some recent research is showing evidence on how new media have a direct neurocognitive impact, including probable long-term evolutionary results (Chan & Rabinowitz, 2006) . New media are exploiting our physiological capacity of direct sensation and reaction through a-conscious interactions. New media constitute a technocultural niche, an enriched or enhanced environment, based on forms of direct knowledge-a knowledge not mediated by intellectual representations.
Every generation has raised concerns regarding the negative impact of media on social skills and personal relationships. The Internet and other new media types are reported to have important social and mental health effects on everyone, especially on adolescents, probably because they are heavy users and their brains and psychology are still very moldable.
Video-game playing, for example, enhances the capacity of visual attention and its spatial distribution. Video-game training enhances task-switching abilities as well as decreasing the attention blink. Thus, both the visual and amodal bottlenecks identified during temporal processing of visual information are reduced in video-game players. Clearly, these individuals have an increased ability to process information over time; however, whether this is due to faster target processing, such as faster selection and stabilization of information in memory, or to an increased ability to maintain several attention windows in parallel, cannot be determined from our current data.
By forcing players to simultaneously juggle a number of varied tasks (detect new enemies, track existing enemies, and avoid getting hurt, among others), action-video-game playing pushes the limits of three rather different aspects of visual attention. It leads to detectable effects on new tasks at untrained locations after only 10 days of training. Therefore, although video-game playing may seem to be rather mindless, it is capable of radically altering visual attention processing. There are several ways by which video-game training could lead to such enhancements. Changes in known attention bottlenecks is certainly a possibility; however, speeded perceptual processes and/or better management of several tasks at the central executive level are also likely to contribute. It will be for future studies of the effect of video-game practice to determine the relative contribution of these different factors to skill learning (Green & Bavelier, 2003) For example, there has been reported a statistical association between television viewing and obesity, attention disorders, school performance, and violence (Mathiak & Weber, 2006) . A significant relationship between Internet use and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has also been shown in elementary school children (Yoo et al., 2004) . The relationship between video games and ADHD is unknown. The incidence of ADHD continues to rise and it is a significant challenge on medical, financial, and educational resources. ADHD is a complex disorder that often requires input from the affected child or adolescent, teachers, parents, and physicians in order to be diagnosed correctly and treated successfully. Adolescents who play more than 1 hour of console or Internet video games a day may have more or more intense symptoms of ADHD or inattention than those who do not (Straker, Pollock, Zubrick, & Kurinczuk, 2006) .
New media and new reflexions are already part of the technocultural niche of our age: This is part of a new evolutionary step we can better understand considering studies on learning and enriched environments. At Harvard, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel studied cats raised blind in one eye, and by 1962 they had demonstrated that such deprivation caused profound structural changes in the cats' visual cortex. Hubel and Wiesel's work made it clear that severe deprivation during critical developmental periods could have catastrophic effects on a growing brain, but the question of whether the opposite was true remained suspended for a while. By 1964, the Berkeley team led by Mark Rosenzweig completed a series of experiments that began to answer those questions. They found that rats raised in an enriched environment, with toys and nice social activities, were not only smarter than rats raised in impoverished environments, but that the improvement in performance correlated with an increase in the weight of the rats' cerebral cortex. The idea that the brain, like a muscle, might respond to cerebral exercise with physical growth was surprising to many, and gave strength to an increasingly powerful theory suggesting that all aspects of the mind-from memory, to dreams, to emotions-have physical correlates. The classical statement by William James (as cited in McDermott, 1967) has found an experimental validation: "Experience is remoulding us at every moment: Whilst we think, our brain changes." Studies on enriched environments are still growing, but they have already established evidence that the brain modifies its structure (not necessarily its size) depending on the kind of niche that Rosenzweig called environmental complexity and training. These studies are now extended to human learning environments (Carbonara, 2005; Orsucci & Sala, 2005) .
cONcLUsION
This book is a multifaceted mirror on how human evolution has had a constant psychobiological link with the development of new tools and environmental changes. Discoveries and technological innovations in information and communication science and technology are paving the ground for new evolutionary steps.
Our new insights in neurocognition and the multiple reflexions implied in our sensory-perceptive processes are leading to new interfaces and new media. The isomorphism between biocognitive structures and the ICT niche we inhabit is progressively blurring boundaries between res cogitans and res extensa. Reflexing interfaces are extensions of human embodiment just as the bone tool tossed skyward by a savannah-dwelling ape. Time flows, always different yet similar. As Varela et al. (1991) stated aphoristically, "Readiness-foraction is a micro-identity and its corresponding level a micro-world: we embody streams of recurrent micro-world transitions."
We are the flow of micro and macro worlds, nested and intermingled. The stream of time flows here and there, generating multiple cascades, reflexing in billions of infinitesimal mirrors, and radiating in what we use to call consciousness. Aoki, K., & Feldman, M. V. (1987) . Toward a theory for the evolution of cultural. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 84, [7164] [7165] [7166] [7167] [7168] 
